Unanswered questions on Collective (CDC) Pensions

It’s good to catch up through social media with Mark Rowlands who has been a work friend since the early 1990s. He most recently worked at Nest and now is easing into retirement through walking (it seems!). His blog is interesting and represents a challenge which this blog will rise to

What follows are Mark Rowlands detailed questions on CDC

With the Pension Schemes Act 2026 now on the statute books and draft regulations for Retirement Collective Defined Contribution (RCDC) landing alongside this month’s Guided Retirement consultation, collective solutions are moving rapidly from policy theory to commercial reality.

Despite being an advocate of collective solutions within retirement income defaults, I find myself with unanswered niggles on CDC and RCDC. This may be a lack of knowledge on my part but despite having left the industry to start my second career, I keep coming back to these concerns, as I consider how and where to secure my own pension for life, as I don’t want to manage it myself, I agreed with my friends, it’s way too hard.

These versions of collective pooling are being hailed, by some, as the silver bullet for retirement income but before the market rushes headlong into CDC and RCDC, there are three niggling questions which I haven’t seen sufficient responses to yet. If we get them wrong, we risk creating serious intergenerational unfairness and repeating some of the worst mistakes of the 1980s and 1990s.

1. The Cashflow and Demographic Reality Check

My understanding is that actuaries distinguish between whole-life CDC where ongoing payroll contributions from younger workers provide steady positive cashflow and decumulation-only RCDC, where there are no active payroll contributions and new liquidity depends entirely on a predictable pipeline of new retirees transferring or defaulting pots into the pool.

While an RCDC fund can still pool longevity risk across a closed or maturing cohort once it reaches scale, its ability to smooth investment risk across generations is heavily constrained by net cashflow. And when you look beneath the bonnet of the UK Master Trust and provider market, the underlying demographics and cash flow as a proportion of assets vary wildly.

Many potential RCDC suppliers do not have a young, fast-growing active membership base feeding a natural pipeline of future retirees. Historically, providers’ target market of employers were the UK’s largest employers who have historically run occupational own trusts and migrated these to a Master Trust. Much of their recent asset growth has come from bulk transfers, scheme wind-ups, and individual consolidations resulting in an older demographic profile and lumpier, less predictable inflows. It seems to me, that to de-risk cashflow concerns, providers will need a wide span of contributing employers which includes SME’s who I doubt have much or any interest in changing their pension provision.

  • A strategic question for providers of CDC and RCDC then, is where will acquire employers and members?
  • What happens to an RCDC pool’s investment strategy when net cashflows turn negative faster than modelled forcing trustees either to hold higher buffers of lower-yielding liquid assets or to sell growth assets during a downturn to pay monthly pensions?
  • How resilient is intergenerational investment smoothing when the ratio of older, drawing members to new entrants is skewed from day one, or if competitive pressures slow down new retiree inflows or retail drawdown providers target transfers out once a cut has been announced?

2. The Governance Tension: Proprietors Market, Trustees Cut

My second and biggest concern sits right at the fault line between commercial ambition, actuarial discipline and independent governance.

Anyone who worked in UK pensions during the 1980s and 1990s remembers the slow-motion train wreck of the With-Profits industry. Providers competed aggressively on headline annual and terminal bonus rates to win new business and keep advisers happy. When investment returns fell, nobody wanted to be the first to cut rates. Schemes over-distributed in the good years, ran down their inherited estates, and left later cohorts of policyholders nursing steep bonus cuts and Market Value Reductions. The same behaviour has manifested more recently in the workplace DC market with the race to the bottom on charges and fees and providers scrambling over single basis point reductions to win new business.

My understanding of the new multi-employer and RCDC regulatory framework, only authorised Master Trusts or multi-employer CDC schemes can establish an RCDC, and the rules enforce a strict separation between the commercial Scheme Proprietor (the founder or funder who owns the business plan and markets the product) and the independent Trustees (who govern the assets and adjust benefits).

On paper, that separation is a sensible safeguard. In practice, it creates an acute governance tension:

  • Proprietors market the headline rate: Commercial proprietors competing for employer tenders and retiring Master Trust members will face intense pressure to advertise attractive target starting incomes potentially built on optimistic return assumptions or thin initial risk buffers.
  • Trustees have to wield the axe: Because there is no sponsoring employer covenant and if markets disappoint or inflows stall, it is the independent trustees who must cut annual increases or nominal payouts.
  • Commercial reluctance to take the reputational hit: Even with an independent board, and how independent will the Board be in reality, how much pressure will trustees face from commercial proprietors to soften or delay painful benefit cuts in a downturn to avoid front-page headlines? Executive KPI’s and bonuses are typically linked to growth and / or market share, imagine the discussions between the proprietor / executive and the trustees if a reduction in income is indicated or rivals have higher headline income rates. We’ve already seen sections of the media aggressively criticise collective solutions, the pressures on the Trustees to avoid reductions will be considerable.  If reductions are delayed, today’s retirees get overpaid at the direct expense of tomorrow’s.

3. Intergenerational Fairness Is Easy to Promise, Hard to Police

In theory, CDC actuarial mechanisms are designed to be actuarially neutral across cohorts, with annual adjustments keeping assets and liabilities in balance. In reality, pricing the entry terms for new cohorts joining a multi-employer RCDC pool requires constant judgement calls on expected returns, inflation, and mortality. The operational complexity of running multiple cohorts with different target incomes is material and the simpler it becomes, the more cross subsidy is required.

In a single-employer whole-life scheme like Royal Mail, there is a shared workforce identity and a single trustee board balancing those trade-offs over decades. In a commercial multi-employer RCDC, where members opt in or default in from dozens of different backgrounds at the exact point of retirement often at different points in the market cycle policing fairness across cohorts becomes exponentially harder. Subtle cross-subsidies between early joiners and later cohorts are almost impossible to eliminate entirely.

None of this means collective solutions shouldn’t be part of the UK’s retirement landscape. Members need and want income for life solutions, and for someone to do it for them. Done well, institutional risk-sharing can deliver better outcomes for members.

But enthusiasm isn’t a strategy. Before we default millions of deferred retirees into RCDC arrangements over the next few years, trustees, actuaries, and regulators need to be brutally honest about net cashflow resilience, the tension between commercial proprietors and trustees, and who bears the cost when markets disappoint.

I’m hoping answers to my niggles exist and I’m sure the collective wisdom of Linked In will tell me what I’ve missed and help me decide how and where to secure my pension for life.


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About henry tapper

Founder of the Pension PlayPen,, partner of Stella, father of Olly . I am the Pension Plowman
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