China wants it – like California; let’s own our technology in our pensions!

 

Will

During the week, I had  lunch with Will Hutton at the RSA Coffee House. It was a strenuous meal where the calories absorbed were burned off in  our determination to out-gesticulate each other!

We discussed British pensions from Stakeholder to CDC, we even talked of the Stakeholder CDC proposal from Derek Benstead a quarter of a century ago!

You can find how hard it is to keep up with the thinking of “Mr Stakeholder” even though he’s in his mid 70’s. I, 10 years his younger, was left in his wake. Here is his most recent thinking in the Observer.

He puts well what I cannot articulate, the pride in our country’s technological prowess and our inability to turn it into productivity and profitability for our people. We have the capital locked up in our pensions to make our technology work for us and yet we let the technology  leak out to America and soon to China. Hutton has other ideas!

But I will shut up and remind myself that Will Hutton was a hero of mine 25 years ago, a long time to wait for lunch but no worse for that. He made sense at the RSA and he makes sense in this article.

China is simultaneously the workshop of the world and an economic calamity waiting to happen. It is arguably the most successful autocratic regime on the planet monitoring, controlling and smothering every move of its 1.4  billion inhabitants, yet at the same time one of the most vulnerable and illegitimate. In some areas – notably its commitment to green technologies, reliance on dirt cheap renewable energy and predictability in its approach to international relationships – it is a welcome exemplar and partner. In others, such as cyber hacking, escalating military ambition and aggressive financial colonialism via its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it is an adversary to be feared.

Yet for all the ambiguity, the second-largest economy in the world cannot be ignored. The International Standard Industrial Classification identifies 419 industrial product categories ranging from furniture to computer manufacture; China’s industry minister boasts that because China produces in each of them it has a “comprehensive” industrial chain. President Xi Jinping’s declared ambition is “completion” – or to dominate all 419 product categories and then do the same in science and technology.

As matters stand, it could. Even if China eventually falls short, to be able to make the claim plausibly is impressive. Today no country can build a 21st century industrial sector without deploying components that are Chinese made, in a crowding out of western industrial capacity that is part of the reason for the widespread slowdown in productivity across the industrialised west. It is an awesome power, allowing China to emerge relatively unscathed in the tariff wars with the US. Yet while Donald Trump may have gone over the top in claiming that Britain’s attempt to create a more sophisticated win-win “strategic” relationship with China – provoked by Keir Starmer’s state visit last week to Beijing – is “dangerous”, real wariness is more than justified.

Even while President Xi was welcoming the thawing of the relationship with Britain, China was assembling a formidable navy in the South China Sea as a reminder to the US that it is all too ready to exploit the vacuum left by the deployment of US naval power to Iran. And note that last year China offered more than $200bn in soft loans under the BRI; more than 150 countries, largely in the global south, are indebted. This is an economic superpower that can count the majority of the world’s countries as client states – a soft 21st century imperialism.

But it is a superpower with chronic weaknesses. If the key to its economic success is its engineering culture and the emphasis on production that follows, as argued by Dan Wang in Breakneck, a book rapidly becoming a must-read on China (and reportedly read by the team around Starmer on the flight to Beijing), that is also a potential foundational flaw. Churchill once said he would rather see finance less proud and industry more content – as true now as it was a hundred years ago – but in China industry is hubristically dominant while finance is the pliant and helpless servant on which the whole system is constructed.

Essentially, China’s economic prowess is built on a volume of never-to-be-repaid bank debt that dwarfs its economy. It is a banking system that, if the losses of trillions of dollars of defunct loans to its industrial corporations were ever crystallised, would be bankrupt. Only the economy’s forward momentum – rather like a bicycle that can never come to a standstill – stops the whole machine from collapsing.

Nor is an Orwellian state’s smothering of all social interaction, and at the limit imprisoning successful entrepreneurs, conducive to innovation. Eighteen months ago, Xi deplored that China’s capacity to produce so-called unicorns – tech companies whose share capital is valued at more than $1bn – seemed to be weakening. The mote is in his own eye, but no colleague is brave enough to tell him. Attacking any source of power other than that dispensed by the party in order to keep control – Xi’s mantra as he enjoys self-appointed lifelong power – necessarily ensures that every Chinese tech founder either aims low or kowtows to the party. Why get arrested for success?

Here, China is as interested in the UK as the US: it wants to build a super-embassy in London and build relations with the UK for similar reasons to that of Larry Ellison, the second-richest man in the US, who wants to embed himself at the heart of Oxford University’s life science research via the Ellison Institute. Britain’s range of scientific achievements, and its capacity to create a generation of viable businesses from them, is understood by the Chinese Communist party and US venture capitalists alike to be among the best in the world.

Britain has the capacity and entrepreneurial culture to become Europe’s tech superpower, especially if the Labour government could reproduce some of China’s single-minded support for science, technology and production by turbo-charging its still too timid if promising policy programme. The world wants to invest in our scale-ups and be part of an emergent success free of the shadow of either Xi or Trump. So, for example, should our irrationally anti-British pension funds and our even more irrational anti-British rightwing political parties.

More importantly, this is one of the most promising avenues to address the cost of living crisis. For a century until the financial crisis British output per person hour grew on average by 2% per year. Since then, the growth has collapsed, and with it the growth in living standards – the background for so much disaffection and the rise of Reform. Almost no great companies have emerged from all our technological and scientific ventures, instead sold overseas. Too many atrophying monopolies have continued. Too much production has been offshored to China.

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The impact of Emma Rampton on Cambridge University’s Endowment.

Emma Rampton became Registrary in 2017.

Emma Rampton – Cambridge Registrary

The office of Registrary was created in 1506 and Emma Rampton was the 27th person – and first woman – to hold it. The Registrary is the University’s principal administrative officer, head of the UAS and Secretary to the University Council.

Here the 21 Group measure the  impact of financial services (administration) on funds available to Cambridge University through its endowment over the past 15 years and especially those of the last 8 years since 2017.

 

The blog in full

Here, we will track the real performance of Cambridge University’s endowment over time and isolate the impact of administrative spending growth above inflation.

We express values in constant 2025 pounds, taking inflation into account through CPI index, and we benchmark investment performance against the MSCI World Index.

We show a counterfactual scenario as to what the endowment would have been if administrative costs had been frozen in real terms at their 2011 level. The gap between the actual and counterfactual endowment values represents the cumulative opportunity cost of excess real administrative spending, showing how above inflation administration growth compounds into materially lower long-term endowment value.

Under this scenario the endowment would now be GBP 1.3bn larger than  it is, or about 30% greater than the current level. Instead of growth, the real value of the endowment is more or less flat over the past decade. (For reference, Ms Rampton takes over as Registrary in 2017).

 

Table 1. Estimated impact of administrative spending above inflation on endowment value

Year Actual Endowment
(£bn, real 2025)
Counterfactual Endowment
(£bn, admin spend inflation-capped)
Cumulative Excess
Admin Spend (£bn, real)
Implied Endowment
Shortfall (£bn)
2011 £2.65 £2.65 £0.00 £0.00
2015 £3.98 £4.03 £0.11 £0.06
2020 £4.57 £4.79 £0.40 £0.22
2025 £4.40 £5.46 £0.95 £1.06
2026 (projected) £4.42 £5.70 £0.95 £1.28

Notes:

1 All figures are June 30 each year (date of reporting for CUEF). The 2026 figures are a projection, not audited outcomes.

  1. The estimates for the “freeze” scenario assume that starting in 2012, admin budget would be indexed in line with inflation at its 2011 level. Any surplus would then be invested in the MSCI World Absolute returns  index with currency hedging to offset any variation in the GBP-USD  exchange rate.
  2. The 2026 counterfactual endowment is a conservative projection based on applying the observed 2025–26 real investment return of the actual endowment to the inflation-capped counterfactual path. No additional excess administrative spending beyond the 2025 cumulative level is assumed.

By 2020, cumulative administrative spending above inflation is associated with an estimated £0.22 bn reduction in the real value of the endowment relative to an inflation-capped spending path. By 2025, it is £1.06bn. These are secure numbers.

On a like-for-like investment basis, the cumulative opportunity cost associated with above-inflation administrative spending is projected to be about £1.3 bn in real terms by July 2026.

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Claire Altman of Standard Life – serious about VFM as delivering pensions!

Claire Altman

This week’s VFM podcast did not go as expected for Nico and Darren as it featured  Claire Altmann as Standard Life’s Managing Director: BPA & Individual Retirement 

I have a very high regard for Claire. She is familiarly Clara and married to Adam Saron who was the Founder of Clara. Clara were the first and to date only superfund challenging the Bulk Purchase Annuity (BPA) and though they bridge to annuity later , they challenge the supremacy of BPA as the gold plated solution that the insurers , the ABI and it seems the PRA have done for the four years since Clara was authorised.

So it is awkward that she talks of her role at Standard Life as an individual and bulk purchase annuity provider. It is tough that she takes over from Tom Ground who was quite open that he left Standard because the insurer is currently out of market and I am quite sure there is something of Adam Saron about Tom.

I wanted to know about this when tuning into podcast 145.

We had a bit from Claire about providing investment product to Quilter.

We had some rumbling about the lack of certainty from CDC from Nico but mostly this 70 minute podcast was about defined benefits – what people Claire told us – really want at retirement.

Here she went dangerously close to being a CDC fan, especially when she explained that private DB pensions in the UK closed when they  became guaranteed rather than aspiring to certainty. If pensions worked “aspiration-ally”  (Steve Webb’s original word for CDC) then why annuities to buy them out?

Claire , the Clara of Clara, our first superfund, was also the driver of Smart for a time and in this pod she admitted that instead of being the shoe in solution for trustees who found their DB funds in surplus, they now had to explain why people were better off with an insurer’s annuity than in a superfund or with a new sponsoring employer as Stagecoach did with Aberdeen.

We didn’t get this far, even though Nico is a paid-up actuary, but she was actually talking the argument for doing the actuarial TAS 300 rather better than I’ve heard it articulated in many circles . TAS 300 is something that a number of members of the House of Lords are arguing should be done rather better too!

My conclusion as I completed my listening to Claire being quizzed on her CV is that Claire is doing the wrong job with the wrong company. Standard Life and Phoenix are retail insurers with their toes dipped in institutional pensions. They must find solutions for Standard Life’s master trusts and GPPs (which include a GPP for BT) and all of these retail DC pension schemes and plans need to end with the certainty that they will continue paying by default a retirement income as long as the members are alive.

Claire is utterly serious in trying to round the square peg for the round hole. But there are many issues that we did not touch on with annuities, not least the fact that the certainty that people buy into when buying individual annuities is the risk of inflation diminishing the value of its income over time. There is also the embarrassment that the consultants she needs the support of, (WTW, Aon, LCP, Hymans et al) are of the opinion that converting to CDC would provide up to 60% more than a DC pot converting to an annuity. That the DWP are telling employers that (headed by Torsten Bell) is even more embarrassing.

So, for all the wishes that this could be a discussion of VFM as Nico and Darren want to, it turned into a discussion of Value for Money as a means of satisfying people that what comes out of their retirement pension is a certain income for the rest of their lives.

The awkwardness of that is that the Government and the actuaries that support Standard Life as a master trust , are beginning to look a little askance at individual annuities and bulk purchase annuities on the grounds of them not delivering VFM. Claire seems still to regard the DB before it made guarantees as delivering VFM. This suggests her heart is more with CDC than annuities.

I am not entirely sure that Claire is happy about her role or her employer, there is a little of Clara still in her! If you want to hear the torture of her soul, then this podcast is for you!

 

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BP does not stand for Broken Promises or Bad Pensions.

I have been following the debates on DB pensions in the House of Lords and know that there is anger with failures of Pensions, to meet their promises when they have the means to do so. On Wednesday I spent a morning with senior trustees and advisors debating what should be done with the surpluses that three quarters of the DB pension funds in this country enjoy.

It is sad that the BP Pensioner Group exists, it is the well-organised tip of an ice burg of resentment among pension scheme members that they and those who followed them and got no DB but only an inferior DC scheme are not entitled to pension scheme surpluses. These surpluses are of course also in the LGPS where the sponsors are primarily council tax payers

I will leave the rest of this blog to John who speaks for BP pensioners but in a way for everyone who loses from the non payment of pension surpluses to those who most need the money.

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Governing Administration in a Consolidated Market – KGC

This is a most thought out post and article. It is the first in what we are promised is a series, I look forward. If this is what being part of IGG means for KGC Associates, then this consolidation that will have worked

 

 

Hayley Mudge

Hayley Mudge

Head of Research at KGC Associates | Part of Independent Governance Group

What structural change means for trustees, providers and the industry

This article is the first in a short series reflecting on how the UK pensions administration market has changed over time, and what those changes mean in practice.

Each part looks at the same market through a different lens – market structure, trustee governance, administrator behaviour and industry resilience. This first piece focuses purely on how the landscape itself has evolved, setting the context for the perspectives that follow.


Introduction

This series began as a straightforward exercise: to map how the UK pensions administration market has changed over time, in preparation for our next administration survey. What emerged was something more consequential.

As we charted exits, mergers, acquisitions and new entrants across the market, it became increasingly clear these changes are not simply about firm-level strategy or competitive positioning. They reflect deeper structural shifts in how pensions administration is delivered, governed and sustained; they carry implications extending well beyond individual providers.

Over the past decade and a half, the administration market has become more consolidated, more interconnected and more operationally concentrated. Providers have exited, businesses have been reconstituted, and scale has increasingly been pursued as a means of managing cost, complexity and risk. At the same time, the capacity, people and platforms underpinning administration have become shared dependencies across the industry.

These developments raise important questions.

How is the industry responding to this new landscape?

What does consolidation signal about operational pressure and resilience?

And how should trustees think about the stability of their own administrator when change elsewhere in the market can have indirect but material effects?

This series explores those questions from multiple perspectives. It considers how consolidation has reshaped the administration market; what it means for trustee governance; how administrator behaviour can be read as a signal of underlying operational dynamics; and why administration should increasingly be viewed as a critical industry infrastructure rather than a routine outsourced service.

Throughout, we apply KGC’s operational governance lens. Rather than focusing on individual firms or short-term performance, we look at how structure, ownership and capacity influence risk, resilience and member outcomes over time. The aim is not to predict failure, but to better understand how the system now behaves, and most importantly, what good governance looks like within it.


Market Landscape

This timeline shows how the UK pensions administration and consulting market has evolved over the past 16 years from our first Administration Survey in 2009. Over this time, acquisitions have been a constant theme. But there have also been significant numbers of mergers, exits and new entrants. Firms with no structural change are shown separately at the end to keep the timeline clear (this maps firms who have participated in our Administration Surveys).

2009–2010: Early Consolidation

Article content

2012–2014: Growth & Market Exits

Article content

2016–2017: Re-branding & Strategic Withdrawals

Article content

2018–2019: Re-brands & Expansion

Article content

2020–2021: New Entrants from Exits

Article content

2022–2023: Accelerated Consolidation

Article content

2024–2025: New Market Structure

Article content

Firms With No Structural Change Over the Period

  • LCP
  • Hymans Robertson
  • Trafalgar House
  • Quantum
  • Cartwright

Key Themes Emerging

  • Sustained consolidation
  • New entrants formed from exits
  • Decline of standalone administrators
  • Private equity and insurance-backed ownership models

The timeline since 2009 illustrates the market has been in a state of continuous structural change. Consolidation is not cyclical. Acquisitions, mergers, exits and reconfigurations have been a persistent feature of the UK pensions administration and consulting landscape.

Several patterns stand out:

  • It seems scale has increasingly been pursued as a means of managing cost, complexity and regulatory expectation
  • Where new entrants have emerged, they have overwhelmingly done so through disruption, carve-outs, exits and iteration
  • Structural change, rather than organic growth, has been the primary mechanism by which the market has evolved
  • The number of firms operating with unchanged ownership and operating models has steadily reduced

Overall, the market is now more concentrated, more interconnected and more dynamic, with implications extending beyond providers to governance, stability and operational risk across the industry.

The next articles explore what these structural changes mean in practice for trustee governance, administrator behaviour and industry resilience.


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Andy Young and Sara Protheroe; pension’s top married couple!

I was reading this morning the Hansard account of the debate in the Lords Grand Committee on the losses incurred on pensioners by legislation that has meant they have had no increases in their pre-97 pensions.

You can read it here, it is a debate about the cost of fixing things for those in the PPF and FAS both going further and (by way of lump sum) going back. The cost is not just in money that will and should be paid but in the cost of administrating this properly.

This brings into the debate the expert in the PPF’s operations one of the “Youngs”, Sara Protheroe. The Conservative  Lord Younger quotes her

I also note the comments made by Sara Protheroe, the PPF’s chief customer officer, who said:

“While implementing this change will be no small task”—

that is probably an understatement—the PPF is

“fully committed to delivering this at the earliest opportunity if and when it becomes law”.

That welcome commitment raises an important practical question for the Government, does it not? What assessment has the Minister made of the extra resources that might be required? What support will be provided to the PPF to ensure that delivery can take place smoothly and without delay? Have the Government assessed whether additional resources, which could come via capacity or funding, will be required to implement this change effectively? If so, how do they intend to provide that support?

A few minutes later we have Baroness Altmann, calling the other half of the Young couple into the debate, as the debate moves on to compensation and the help that can be made to those worst hit by loss of pensions this century. Here she is.

I understand—I will go through this in more detail in the next group—that the Financial Assistance Scheme, for example, is supposedly funded by public money, while the PPF itself and employer contributions, in the form of the levy, provides the money for PPF compensation, but £2 billion from the scheme was transferred to the public purse. Thankfully, when we were trying to improve the Financial Assistance Scheme in 2005, Andrew Young recommended stopping annuity purchase, which had been happening and, unfortunately, transferred much of the money to insurers rather than putting it towards the Government to pay out over time. Nevertheless, the Financial Assistance Scheme itself represents some of the biggest losers and the ones with the most pre-1997 accrual.

I will not bore readers by giving my views on this debate. They can read the Hansard report on what happened from lunchtime into the early afternoon here. The debate includes many good friends of this blog and the Pension PlayPen , in particular Lord (Bryn) Davies.

What is said by all in this debate on the Pension Schemes Bill is unlikely to be widely reported as the amendments put forward were withdrawn because they were Conservative amendments , but Bryn is a union man and his comments are important. I hope he will talk to us when these debates are finished on Pension PlayPen.


A challenge to the pension world – is there a married couple like the Youngs?

I bring this debate to my reader’s attention because they are independently quoted as authoritative.

I imagine there were Peers listening to the debate who clocked Sara Protheroe being quoted by Lord Younger and Andrew Young being referred to by Baroness Altmann, both between 1:30 and 1:45.

I hope that a mental record was made – for I suspect what we have here is something of a record from a couple who have done more for those in PPF and FAS than any other!

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Why pensioners aren’t giving up work (or paying much tax)

Fun deferred?

This is an extraordinary story about what is happening to people of my age (64). We aren’t giving up and we’re looking at double bubble fiscal fun when we reach our state pension age.

What Helena Kelly has got to say

You don’t pay national insurance once you hit state pension age. It’s a £1.1 billion perk the chancellor considered axing — but would that drive out older workers?

Danielle Barbereau has watched her husband throw himself into retirement, happily relishing daily DIY and long walks near their Northumberland home. It is not a life she envies.

Barbereau, 67, loves to work. A brief stint of unemployment in her early fifties turbocharged her work ethic and led her to pivot from being a university academic to a self-employed divorce coach. She has no desire to give up a career that she has spent nearly two decades building.

Some 2.12 million people aged 66 and older were still working in the 2024-25 tax year despite being past state pension age, according to HM Revenue & Customs. It underpins a curious trend in Britain’s topsy-turvy Labour market: as more young people shun the workplace, the nation’s pensioners can’t get enough of it.

The number of 16 to 24-year-olds not in education, employment or training — so-called Neets — hit an 11-year high of 987,000 early last year before dropping to 946,000 by September. It means that about one in eight young adults are Neets, with long-term mental health problems being cited as one of the reasons for the high number.

By comparison, 1.56 million workers who had passed the state pension age — 66 at the moment but rising to 67 by 2028 — were still on company payrolls in 2024-25, up 12 per cent from the 1.39 million in the 2020-21 tax year. A further 562,000 — including Barbereau — continue to do some form of self-employed work, an 8 per cent increase from five years ago.

There are now more people over 70 paying income tax than under-30s. HMRC data from the 2022-23 financial year — the latest available — shows that 5.45 million people over 70 paid income tax, compared with 5.23 million people aged below 30.

Barbereau said that her decision to keep working was born out of desire not necessity. She and her husband are mortgage-free and have their own private pensions. She has worked with more than 1,400 clients as a coach, and never worries about “turning the heating on”, she said.

“It helps that I am self-employed. If I was still in employment, I would be very difficult to manage, much more rebellious. Everybody expected me to stop working at 66 but why would I stop? My job is my raison d’être.”

Dennis Reed from the group Silver Voices, which campaigns on behalf of the over-60s, said that other working pensioners are not so lucky. “The state pension is insufficient to meet everyday needs. More and more people are being forced to take on work.”

Al new state pension will go up to £241.30 a week — £12,547 a year — in April.

Reed said that those with generous private pensions may keeping working to combat loneliness, “mix with others and make friends with co-workers”.

The £1.1bn tax break

The nation’s growing pensioner workforce may be a good thing for Barbereau, but it adds up to a national insurance loss for the Treasury. That’s because an anomaly in the tax system means that you stop paying national insurance on wages once you reach state pension age — you are still liable for income tax.

National insurance is levied at 8 per cent of earnings between £12,570 and £50,270 and 2 per cent on income above this. You do not pay it on wages below £12,570 or on income from private pensions. The exemption for pensioners exists because historically most people stopped working once they could claim the state pension.

This could be double bubble fun for pensioners , even if it’s fun deferred.

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Dividends and “the return nobody got” – Paul McCaffrey

The CFA has produced an excellent paper; you can download it here.

Long-run stock returns look extraordinary, yet few investors became rich. This brief explains why dividend reinvestment assumptions overstate historical equity returns, reframing the equity risk premium as “the return nobody got.”

Equity markets have delivered remarkable long-run returns on paper, yet those gains rarely translated into lasting, generational wealth for most investors. “Stocks for the Long Run Revisited: Dividends and ‘The Return Nobody Got’” examines this disconnect by rethinking how long-term equity performance has been measured and, more importantly, how dividends are treated in historical return series.

Dividends have accounted for a substantial share of equity returns over at least the past century. Standard total-return calculations implicitly assume that dividends are continuously reinvested, whether back into the issuing stock, into a perfectly tracked index, or into other securities. These assumptions are analytically convenient, but they describe an investment behavior that was largely unavailable, impractical, or uncommon for most investors before the rise of low-cost index funds.

Drawing on insights from Rob Arnott, Hendrik Bessembinder, Edward McQuarrie, Roger Ibbotson, Jeremy Siegel, and Elroy Dimson, the brief shows that dividends were often consumed, taxed, or reinvested imperfectly. Transaction costs, sales loads, bid–ask spreads, delayed reinvestment, portfolio drift, and management fees materially reduced realized outcomes. When dividends are treated as cash flows that fund consumption rather than as capital that compounds indefinitely, long-run equity returns fall sharply, and the implied equity risk premium narrows accordingly.

The brief also explores how declining transaction costs and the advent of indexing reshaped the economics of investing, contributing to higher equilibrium equity valuations in recent decades. These structural changes help explain why historical averages may offer limited guidance for future expectations.

Ultimately, this brief reframes long-run equity returns as a measure of asset-class potential rather than a record of typical investor experience. By distinguishing theoretical returns from realizable outcomes, it offers a more grounded perspective on equity performance, valuation, and the true nature of the long-term equity premium


We would like to hear Paul McCaffrey, he could  make a good coffee morning presenter

Do you agree?

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LTAFs? “Do not be short oh investment trusts” says a shrewdy (or two)!

Here’s the home of old fashioned British success.

Here’s the voice of a senior peer from the House of Lords.

Here’s the voice of our stock market

 

Here’s one voice from the counties

 

Here’s the voice of the Research and Content Director at The Association of Investment Companies (AIC)

For me, the LTAF is a way to make a killing if you work for Hargreaves Lansdown, Schroders of one of the many insurance companies filling their trousers with LTAFs as they spend our workplace pension money in ways that circumvent the charge cap but pay the dividends of your owners.

The trade associations of the fund managers and insurers are happy to use the press to sing the virtues of LTAFs while investment companies/trusts continue to sit unloved , a direct purchase from the FTSE 250.

Thankfully, Ros Altmann and Sharon Bowles sing from the upper house of Lord the benefit to retail investors of holdings in UK companies unquoted themselves but having access to investment were pensions still up to it. That most trust run pensions are not investing in growth  while commercial pensions are invested in LTAFs, tells me that Altmann and Bowles are right and so are those IFAs and local fund management who used to be local stockbrokers. Well said Neil Winward, I hope to learn from you as I do from the upper house!

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USS pension performance under the Clacher and Keating microscope.


Some unlucky stocks picked?


Private – does that mean opaque rather than transparent?

Is this delivering value for money?

Con Keating doesn’t think so

The rosy funding statements are based on accounting and actuary reporting

Which is why poor investment performance has been ignored by most pensions folk

There are some good stories

Comparison with performance with others may not be liked but is it unfair?

Iain Clacher sees an improvement in the USS investment outlook and Chair Barker is of the same view.

A changing picture at USS for all parties

Pretty well off academic pensioners.

This is a much better story than ten years ago when the scheme was threatened with closure as a defined benefit arrangement.

The DC plan is primarily used to pay tax free cash for those with healthy DB pensions and contribution rates remain healthy by comparison with those paid to most pure DC members of other schemes. Con Keating is right to point out that USS has not yet achieved performance to give it anything to crow about and Iain Clacher’s optimism is yet to be born fruit!

It is however good to see USS open and proving the sceptics 10 years ago, very wrong.

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