USS gives its top brass an 18% pay hike despite writing off Thames Water

 

The latest report and accounts for USS are out

They show how the scheme is doing under a number of measures. As Toby Nangle says on BlueSky, “this is always helpful“.

When I started writing about USS , 7 years ago, there was a real possibility that this great scheme would be closed for future accrual, locked down in bonds to be an albatross around university’s necks and a source of constant strife between teachers and their finance departments.

Now the scheme is in surplus and its DC section achieving outstanding results for its retirement savers.

Undoubtedly, the rosy picture that these numbers paint today will at some future point return to a point where liabilities are less than assets on all bases. Then we should remember that funding is not constant and that time corrects markets to long-term rates of return.

Those who called for scheme closure and a switch to DC for all future benefits should be remembered at this point. Accountability works two ways. When hard times come a calling in the future, we should hold our nerve,


Holding our nerve

We should remember that the assets within the scheme include a substantial holding of Thames Water’s equity. The Scheme’s CIO, Simon Pilcher comments

Despite our very best efforts, it is clear this has not been a successful investment. While poor performance of a single
asset should be considered in terms of our overall
performance, as I will discuss below, this has been
deeply disappointing, and we recognise the concern it
will have caused our members

I cannot find a line in the financial statements that tells us what USS values its equity holding in Thames Water (Kemble) at. If it is at much more than nothing, I would be surprised. Marked to market , the equity has no buyer and no value.

And this too is a lesson. The scale of USS has enabled it to make this disastrous mistake without putting scheme benefits at risk.


Rewarded like a hedge fund?

In many respects , USS is the well run scheme it should be and it should reward those who manage it at the market rate. However, I am beginning to wonder if the benchmark for rewarding its staff is now the hedge fund rather than the pension scheme. We learn that

 Excluding the release of the pension deficit recovery
liability, pension management costs increased by
£4m (9%), while total investment management costs,
including embedded fees increased by £12m (5%).
Personnel costs (excluding group functions) have
increased by £17m (20%), primarily arising from inflation
and increased headcount as we continue to strengthen
our internal investment management capability.

The deficit recovery liability was £20m which seems to have been absorbed into staff costs, especially senior management costs which increased from £54m to £64m over the year, an eye-watering 18% pay rise.

 

This pension scheme now employs nearly 250 people earning over £100,000 and 6 earning over one million pounds a year.

These are hedge fund rewards, but are any of these executives bearing any risk themselves?

The scheme is doing well but there seems nothing in the reward structure that reflects that over the year nearly £1bn was written off the scheme’s assets because of the failure of Thames Water. Thames Water was – originally – marked into the accounts at £956m.

(note this is  a correction on a misquoted £5bn previously- thanks to reader Jon)


Setting the bar

USS is our largest occupational pension, it manages money for many employers and does so with a well managed DC and DB section. It has achieved the economies of scale needed to make it a force in the land and indeed it is just that.

It is doing the things the Government wants pension schemes to do and while it makes a mess of things from time to time, generally it is a success story. Nevertheless it does its work with “other people’s money”.

Though USS is setting the bar, it is also establishing pay awards for senior staff which seem to me excessive.  It needs to do more to justify these pay levels if UCU and UUK are not to ask why that money might not be better spent reducing employer and employee contributions.

About henry tapper

Founder of the Pension PlayPen,, partner of Stella, father of Olly . I am the Pension Plowman
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4 Responses to USS gives its top brass an 18% pay hike despite writing off Thames Water

  1. Byron McKeeby says:

    One of the changes from the earlier consultation version in TPR’s General Code published this year was that the Regulator no longer expected trustees to publish either their remuneration policy or their trustee meeting minutes.

    Regarding what remains (behind closed doors) on the remuneration policy is now that policy only needs to cover expenses paid for by the trustees and does not need to set out service provider fee arrangements or the actual remuneration paid by trustees.

    As a leading scheme I suggest the USS should go beyond the regulatory minimum and publish its remuneration policy.

    But there is always a danger that such transparency simply leads to levelling up. This happened in PLC land when they formed remuneration committees of non-executive directors, taking external
    professional
    advice from head hunters and their ilk.
    The resulting inter-firm comparisons seemed to lead to even higher remuneration all round.

  2. Jon says:

    “….over the year nearly £5bn was written off the scheme’s assets because of the failure of Thames Water.”

    Maybe I’m misunderstanding, but the scheme’s stake in Thames Water was reported as 20%, and the FT notes that the stake was valued at £956m two years ago. So while the scheme’s write down is substantial, it’s nowhere near £5bn. In fact, £5bn appears to be less than Thames’ total value prior to this situation developing.

    https://www.ft.com/content/e2e459ab-8eb7-4390-8584-eed07e936ee1

  3. Byron McKeeby says:

    Yes, USS reduced the value of its 20% stake in Thames Water from £956 million in 2022 to £364.4 million in 2023. This is a reduction of almost two-thirds in the value of the stake, but nowhere near £5bn by a factor of maybe five times.

    However, citing much needed investment by Thames Water to improve customer service and environmental standards, TW shareholders committed to supporting a further £3.25 billion of investment on top of the £500 million previously provided, and pledged to take no cash out of the business until a turnaround was delivered.

    So arguably, if undrawn commitments as a major shareholder are taken into account, the pensions “asset” with close to zero market value may have tipped over into becoming a “liability” which may not yet be reflected in the USS accounts, as accountants relegate commitments to the footnotes.

    But I do agree that a write down estimate of £5bn seems to be way too much.

    Perhaps USS insiders who read this blog may be willing to shed more light on all of this?

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