I’m proud to have been on hug terms with Will Hutton at a recent conference. He was speaking and I was grovelling because I missed him. But I’d had a chat earlier about how influential he’d been to my and my family’s economic thinking twenty years ago. Enough grovelling, this is a serious article which is in line with blogs that have been on here about the need to grow Britain by creating the new. So over to Will Hutton
This was first published in the Observer – here.

The fiscal black hole never existed. Those baby steps towards growth could have been technological leaps
Economic growth in the 21st century will be driven by the adoption and commercialisation at scale of a phenomenal range of new technologies. Mastery of these is already cementing US economic growth; similar mastery of green technologies is behind China’s economic boom.
This is “creative destruction” – the evisceration of the old and the creation of the new. The challenge for Britain is to find its way to a parallel growth alchemy. It’s a challenge to which last Wednesday’s budget did not rise.
The US and China have two advantages denied Britain. First, they have been able to drive through destabilising change careless of the social consequences. In China, this is because it is a totalitarian autocracy. In the US, it is the belief that the state should accept only minimal responsibility to compensate for individual hardship.
Second, they have continental economies that allow fledgling enterprises to scale up into organisations of size within one economic regulatory jurisdiction. The UK has neither.
Importantly, both countries have a third arrow in their growth quiver – a sophisticated ecosystem for supplying risk capital to young innovative scale-ups and then fostering competition between them to develop innovative winners.
In the US, this is done through a network of skilled venture capitalists, who follow initial investment rounds with successive further rounds for competing companies that prove themselves. They may supply only 0.2% of all US investment, but nearly half of all American public companies started as venture capital-backed.
The Chinese copy the Americans. Their state-owned banks invest in “little giants”, which then compete with each other for the next round of venture funding. No venture capitalist or party official can anticipate which will succeed and which will fail. In both systems, most fail, but the success from the few that succeed more than compensates.
In the spending review, Labour found another £1bn a year for the British Business Bank to invest in young scale-ups, and has cajoled Britain’s pension funds into potentially matching that investment through the Mansion House accord and Sterling 20 initiatives.
The budget announced a stamp duty holiday for three years after a young company floats on the stock exchange to encourage investors, and some other tax breaks. All are helpful but, given that we now know the famed fiscal black hole never existed, these are baby steps that could and should have been leaps.
To spend pro-rata what the Americans and Chinese allocate annually for venture investment, the scale of what Britain does needs, as a minimum, to be trebled, not least to help staunch the sales of UK tech companies to the Americans. For example, if just 10% of the exploding £109bn budget for ill-health and disability benefits for 2030-31 were to be reallocated to venture investment, Britain could build a trillion-pound tech economy by 2040.
Two more growth props are needed. The first is an employment, training and social security system that allows everyone to be fast-moving. There is a template for all this in Denmark’s “flexicurity” system. The UK needs one like it. Friday’s decision to abandon the proposed qualifying period for unfair dismissal from day one to six months is a step in the right direction, but it needs to be accompanied by huge investment in training programmes and income support for the transitionally unemployed.
Last, the EU. All British companies need access to the EU single market, but young growth companies most of all. Britain, as David Miliband argued recently, should address the debilitating post-Brexit crisis in the UK’s goods trade with Europe by unilaterally aligning with single market rules. This should be the precursor to rejoining the single market.
In addition, the negotiations to join the €150bn EU defence procurement scheme should never have been allowed to collapse through British cheese-paring. The EU dramatically dropped its price tag; Britain should have increased its offer. Here, UK growth and European security interests coincide. Fear of Nigel Farage’s reaction should be put aside. He is, in one of the chancellor’s best budget lines, a Russian asset.
A recurring theme in this paper’s Road to the Budget series has been the urgent need to accelerate the UK’s growth. On this, the budget at least held the line on maintaining vital public investment, but essentially offered little else.
What Britain needs to do stares us in the face. Labour should just do it.

Britain needs to stop the school yard politics of short term squabbling noise it is negative and destructive and inhibits recovery and encourages capital to leave for more optimistic jurisdictions
A quick review of recent history
Major Economic Milestones:
🔹 Pre-Financial Crisis (2004-2007)
Robust financial services sector
Strong consumer spending and housing market
GDP growth averaging 2-3% annually
🔹 Financial Crisis Era (2008-2012)
2008: Banking sector crisis originating in UK and US
2009: Deepest recession since WWII (-4.2% GDP contraction)
2010-2012: Austerity measures and slow recovery
🔹 Recovery and Brexit Era (2013-2019)
2013-2015: Strong recovery, unemployment falling
2016: Brexit Referendum – immediate currency devaluation
2017-2019: Prolonged uncertainty affecting business investment
🔹 Recent Challenges (2020-2024)
2020: COVID-19 pandemic – 9.8% GDP contraction (worst in G7)
2021-2022: Strong recovery but inflation surge
2023-2024: Managing post-Brexit trade relationships and economic adjustment
Structural Changes: Sectoral Evolution:
Services: Remained dominant (~80% of economy)
Manufacturing: Continued decline as % of GDP
Financial Services: Remained crucial despite Brexit concerns
Technology: Emerging as growth driver
🌍 Global Position:
Maintained 6th position globally despite challenges
Relative decline compared to rapidly growing Asian economies
Per capita income remained among world’s highest
The UK economy has shown remarkable resilience through multiple crises while adapting to significant structural changes including Brexit and the shift toward a more service-oriented, technology-focused economy.
Some of us might not have 20 years to see the recovery so capital flight will continue